minor child is not an absolute proprietory right, but it is in the nature of a trust which imposes upon him the reciprocal obligation to maintain his infant child, and the law secures him in his right only so long as he discharges his correlative duties. *Nugent* v. *Powell,* 4 Wyo. 173. By abandonment of his child, the father forfeits his right to its services. *Clark* v. *Bayer,* 32 Oh. St. 299; *Stansburg* v. *Bertron,* 7 Watts. & S. 362. By what act abandonment takes place depends upon the circumstances in each case. *Greenwood* v. *Greenwood,* 28 Md. 369. In the principal case the court held that upon the evidence there was no room to doubt that the father had abandoned his daughter. The father having abandoned his daughter and cast the burden of her support on the plaintiff, his right to his daughter's services also devolved upon plaintiff. *Nugent* v. *Powell,* 4 Wyo. 173; *Delatour* v. *Mackay,* 139 Cal. 621. Plaintiff thus being in a position to demand her daughter's services, her right to maintain this action follows.

SALE OF STANDING TIMBER.—RIGHT OF ENTRY TO CUT.—Plaintiff conveyed standing timber by deed to A, with a right of entry for removal during the period of seven years. A conveyed his timber rights to B, and B conveyed to C, who sold the timber rights to D, and these timber rights afterwards passed by mesne conveyances to the defendant. Plaintiff brought action in trespass against the defendant for cutting and removing trees. *Held,* that the right of entry was incidental merely, and could not exist apart from the ownership of the timber. *Yarbrough* v. *Stewart,* (Ala. 1915) 67 So. 980.

The ground upon which the court in the principal case bases its decision is that such a contract is a mere license, revocable at the will of the grantor. This is undoubtedly true where the license in question is merely a parol one, giving the grantee the right to enter and remove standing timber. *Hodsdon* v. *Kennett,* 73 N. H. 225; *Walter* v. *Lowrey,* 74 Miss. 484; *Garner* v. *Mahoney,* 115 Iowa 356; *Spacy* v. *Evans,* 158 Ind. 431. But a different rule is by several cases held to exist where the timber is conveyed by deed, for a valuable consideration, granting the right to enter and remove for a certain definite period of time. In such cases it is held that the right is a license coupled with an interest, not revocable by the grantor during the period specified. *McLeod* v. *Dial,* 63 Ark. 10; *Bolland* v. *O'Niel,* 81 Minn. 15; 25 CYC. 649. These cases, which seem to be in accord both with reason and common sense, would, if sound, control the decision in the principal case. Interpreting the agreement in question as a license coupled with an interest, the right of the assignee of the interest to exercise the license is apparent, and the grantor would not have the right to revoke the license so as to defeat such interest. *Russell* v. *Hubbard,* 59 Ill. 335; *Putnam* v. *White,* 76 Me. 551.

SURETYSHIP—POSITION OF MARRIED WOMAN RELEASING HOMESTEAD RIGHTS. —A husband and wife were both made defendants in a suit on a promissory note, and to foreclose a mortgage. The note was executed by the husband alone. The mortgage covered the homestead and was executed by both husband and wife. The wife defended on the ground that several exten-